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   n 2019 and again in 2020, President Trump pardoned or otherwise granted 
clemency to a number of men charged with or convicted of conduct consti-
tuting war crimes.1 Trump’s actions were widely condemned,2 including by 
some legal scholars who argued that Trump’s intervention in these cases 
could itself constitute a war crime under the doctrine of command respon-
sibility.3  
This article explores one element of the doctrine of command responsi-
bility invoked by those alleging that President Trump’s pardons could 
amount to war crimes: a commander’s duty to punish war crimes by his sub-
 
1. See Mihir Zaveri, Trump Pardons Ex-Army Soldier Convicted of Killing Iraqi Man, NEW 
YORK TIMES (May 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/us/trump-pardon-
michael-behenna.html; Nicholas Wu & John Fritze, Trump Pardons Servicemembers in High Pro-
file War Crimes Cases, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/politics/2019/11/15/donald-trump-pardons-clint-lorance-mathew-golsteyn-war-
crime-cases/1229083001/; Dave Philipps, Trump Clears Three Service Members in War Crimes 
Cases, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/ 
15/us/trump-pardons.html; Michael Safi, Trump Pardons Blackwater Contractors Jailed for Mas-
sacre of Iraq Civilians, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2020/dec/23/trump-pardons-blackwater-contractors-jailed-for-massacre-of-iraq-
civilians. 
2. See Rachel E. VanLandingham, Betrayer in Chief? Pardoning Troops Accused or Convicted of 
Murder Would Wound Military, USA TODAY (May 21, 2019), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/opinion/2019/05/21/donald-trump-military-pardons-column/374456100 
2/ (warning that President Trump’s pardon of a convicted war criminal will have a negative 
effect on U.S. “military good order and discipline”); Chris Jenks, Sticking It to Yourself: Preemp-
tive Pardons for Battlefield Crimes Undercut Military Justice and Military Effectiveness, JUST SECURITY 
(May 20, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64185/sticking-it-to-yourself-preemptive-
pardons-for-battlefield-crimes-undercut-military-justice-and-military-effectiveness/; Don-
ald J. Guter et al., The American Way of War Includes Fidelity to the Law: Preemptive Pardons Break 
That Code, JUST SECURITY, (May 24, 2019) https://www.justsecurity.org/64260/the-ameri-
can-way-of-war-includes-fidelity-to-law-preemptive-pardons-break-that-code/; David 
Lapan, President Trump Is Damaging Our Military: War Crimes Cases Are the Latest Example, JUST 
SECURITY (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/67310/president-trump-is-dam-
aging-our-military-war-crimes-cases-are-the-latest-example/. 
3. See Gabor Rona, Can a Pardon Be a War Crime?: When Pardons Themselves Violate the 
Laws of War, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/64288/can-a-
pardon-be-a-war-crime-when-pardons-themselves-violate-the-laws-of-war/; Stuart Ford, 
Has President Trump Committed a War Crime by Pardoning War Criminals?, 35 AMERICAN UNI-













ordinates. Specifically, this piece examines the United States’ own past recog-
nition of the duty to punish as an element of command responsibility under 
the law of war.  
The reason for this focus is to demonstrate how deeply rooted the duty 
to punish is in the United States’ stated understanding of command respon-
sibility. The principle that a commander has an obligation to punish war 
crimes by his subordinates is not a progressive development of the law pro-
moted by the advocacy community. Instead, the duty to punish stands out 
as an ancient legal norm interwoven into the domestic law of the United 
States and which the United States has incorporated into international legal 
instruments. The history reviewed in this article illustrates a through line in 
the professed values of the United States, from the command of the Conti-
nental Army by General George Washington, to the Nuremberg trials, to 
efforts at accountability for Balkan atrocities and the struggles for justice for 
the thousands of Americans murdered on 9/11. The lesson from this history 
is clear, if not always appreciated: commanders who fail to punish their sub-
ordinates for war crimes may themselves be war criminals.  
This article examines the previous recognition by the United States of the 
duty to punish. It does not seek to undertake a de novo review of State practice 
and opinio juris. Nor does this article attempt to delineate the scope or content 
of the duty to punish, much less apply that duty to any specific set of facts. 
Finally, this article does not seek to address the many other legal issues raised 
by President Trump’s pardons of specific individuals, including how the duty 
to punish may interact with other international and domestic legal obliga-
tions and authorities, including the President’s pardon power under Article 
II of the Constitution.  
 
II. WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY  
 
War crimes are generally defined as serious violations of the law of war which 
entail individual criminal liability under international law.4 Under the doc-
trine of command responsibility, a commander may in some circumstances 
 
4. See HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED 
STATES MARINE CORPS, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 8-2 (2019) [hereinafter FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C] (“For pur-












incur criminal liability in connection with war crimes committed by his sub-
ordinates.5  
Command responsibility imposes both forward-looking and backward-
looking obligations upon a commander to promote compliance with the law 
of war by his subordinates. Ex ante, a commander has an obligation to pre-
vent war crimes by his subordinates. Ex post, a commander has an obligation 
to punish war crimes committed by his subordinates. A commander’s failure 
to uphold either his duty to prevent or duty to punish may give rise to his 
own responsibility for war crimes.6  
This duty to punish has been a key element of command responsibility 
for centuries. As early as 1439, King Charles VII of France issued an ordi-
nance identifying the failure of a commander to discipline a subordinate as a 
basis for the punishment of the commander. 
 
The King orders each captain or lieutenant to be held responsible for the 
abuses, ills, and offenses committed by members of his company, and that 
as soon as he receives any complaint . . . he bring the offender to justice . . 
. . If he fails to do so or covers up the misdeed . . . the captain shall be deemed 
responsible for the offense, as if he had committed it himself and shall be punished in the 
same way as the offender would have been.7  
 
III. U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE DUTY TO PUNISH 
 
A. U.S. Articles of War 
 
The duty to punish as an element of command responsibility was embedded 
in the American understanding of the law of war even before the United 
States declared its independence. The Provisional Congress of the Massa-




5. For an overview of command responsibility, see generally William H. Parks, Command 
Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 1 (1973); Illias Bantekas, Contemporary 
Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 573 (1999); 
GUENAEL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (2009). 
6. See Bantekas, supra note 5 (describing the elements of command responsibility). 
7. 13 ORDONNANCES DES ROIS DE FRANCE DE LA TROISIÉME RACE 308 (1782), 












Every officer, commanding in quarters or on a march, shall keep good or-
der, and, to the utmost of his power, redress all such abuses or disorders 
which may be committed by any officer or soldier under his command: If 
upon any complaint [being] made to him, of officers or soldiers beating, or 
otherwise ill-treating any person, or of committing any kind of riot, to the 
disquieting of the inhabitants of this Continent; he the said commander, who 
shall refuse or omit to see justice done on the offender or offenders, and reparation 
made to the party or parties injured, as far as the offender’s wages shall 
enable him or them, shall, upon due proof thereof, be punished as ordered by 
a general court-martial, in such manner as if he himself had committed the crimes or 
disorders complained of . . . .8  
 
The Second Continental Congress reproduced this language in Article 
XII of the Articles of War, adopted on June 30, 17759 (a week after George 
Washington was commissioned as Commander in Chief), and again in Arti-
cle IX of the Articles of War, adopted on September 20, 1776.10 The 1806 
Articles of War incorporated the duty to punish in Articles 3211 and 33.12  
 
8. Massachusetts Provisional Congress, Articles of War art. XI (1775) (emphasis added). 
9. Continental Congress, Articles of War art. XII (June 30, 1775), https://avalon.law. 
yale.edu/18th_century/contcong_06-30-75.asp. 
10. Continental Congress, Articles of War § IX, art. 1 (Sept. 20, 1776), https://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/contcong_09-20-76.asp. 
11. Articles of War, 1806, ch. 20, § 1, 2 Stat. 359, 363 (“Every officer commanding in 
quarters, garrisons or on the march, shall keep good order, and, to the utmost of his power, 
redress all abuses or disorders which may be committed by any other or soldier under his 
command; if; upon compliant made to him of officers or soldiers beating or otherwise ill-
treating any person, or disturbing fairs or markets, or of committing any kinds of riots, to 
the disquieting of the citizens of the United States, he, the said commander, who shall reuse 
or omit to see justice done to the offender or offenders, and reparation made to the party 
or parties injured, as far as part of the offenders pay shall enable him or them, shall, upon 
proof thereof, be cashiered, or otherwise punished, as a general court martial shall direct.”). 
12. Id. at 364 (“When any commissioned officer or soldier shall be accused of a capital 
crime, or of having used violence, or committed any offense against person or property of 
any citizen of the United States, such as punishable by the known laws of the land, the 
commanding officer and officers of every regiment, troop, or company, to which the person 
or persons so accused shall belong; are hereby required; upon application duly made by, or 
in behalf of; the party or parties injured; to use their utmost endeavors to deliver over such 
accused person or persons to the civil magistrate, and likewise to be aiding and assisting to 
the officers of justice to bring him or them to trial. If any commanding officer or officers 
shall willfully neglect, or shall refuse, upon application aforesaid, to deliver over such ac-
cused person or persons to the civil magistrates, or to be aiding and assisting officers of 












In addition, during the nineteenth century, the duty to punish was also 
sometimes inferred as an element of the “general” article of the Articles of 
War. In his commentary on Article 62,13 William Winthrop cites the “failure 
to bring offending inferiors to punishment” as an example of conduct 
deemed an offence under General Orders issued in 1862 and 1890.14 
 
B. Proposed Post-World War I War Crimes Tribunal 
 
Although the United States had clearly acknowledged that a commander’s 
duty to punish subordinates was an element of U.S. military law, at the end 
of the First World War, the United States also took the position that the duty 
to punish was an element of command responsibility under the international 
law of war. In 1919, an international “Commission on the Responsibility of 
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties” convened in Ver-
sailles on the margins of the Paris Peace Conference.15 The Commission was 
charged, inter alia, with inquiring into and reporting upon “[t]he constitution 
and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offenses (crimes 
relating to the war).”16  
The U.S. representatives on the body, Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
and international lawyer James Brown Scott, acknowledged that in certain 
circumstances it would be appropriate for an international criminal tribunal 
(as opposed to the domestic military tribunals of individual belligerents) to 
try defendants for war crimes under international law. 
 
[I]f an act violating the laws and customs of war committed by an enemy 
affected more than one country, a tribunal could be formed of the coun-
tries affected by uniting the national commissions or courts thereof, in 
which event the tribunal would be formed by the mere assemblage of the 
 
13. Articles of War, 1874 art. 62, 18 Stat. 228 (1874) (“All crimes not capital, and all 
disorders and neglects, which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good 
order and military discipline, though not mentioned in the foregoing articles of war, are to 
be taken cognizance of by a general, of a regimental, garrison, or field-officers’ court-martial, 
according to the nature and degree of the offence, and punished at the discretion of such 
court.”). 
14. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 726 (2nd ed. 1920). 
15. Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1920). 











members, bringing with them the law to be applied, namely, the laws and 
customs of war . . . .17 
 
Nonetheless, the United States had a number of reservations to the 
Commission’s specific proposal for a tribunal, which it detailed in a memo-
randum. Many of these objections flowed from concerns that the law to be 
applied by the proposed tribunal would be ex post facto.18 One of these objec-
tions related to the standard for command responsibility to be applied by the 
proposed tribunal. One of the categories of persons to be tried before the 
tribunal proposed by the Commission was those exercising command re-
sponsibility. 
 
Against all authorities, civil or military, belonging to enemy countries, how-
ever high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, includ-
ing heads of state, who order, or, with knowledge thereof and with power 
to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to prevent, put-
ting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war (it 
being understood that no such abstention should constitute a defense for 
the actual perpetrators).19 
 
In its memorandum of reservations, the United States outlined its views 
of the appropriate contours of command responsibility as a mode of liability. 
Lansing and Scott stated that they were “unalterably opposed” to an earlier 
proposed formulation of command responsibility under which “persons 
were declared liable because they ‘abstained from preventing, putting an end 
to, or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war.’”20 
In elaborating on the correct standard for command responsibility under 
the law of war, Lansing and Scott explained: 
 
To establish responsibility in such cases it is elementary that the individual 
sought to be punished should have knowledge of the commission of the 
acts of a criminal nature and that he should have possessed the power as well as 
the authority to prevent, to put an end to, or repress them. Neither knowledge 
of commission nor ability to prevent is alone sufficient. The duty or obli-
gation to act is essential. They must exist in conjunction, and a standard of 
liability which does not include them all is to be rejected.21  
 
17. Id. at 142. 
18. Id. at 147. 
19. Id. at 121. 
20. Id. at 143. 












In other words, there was no strict liability under the doctrine of command 
responsibility. To the contrary, under the law of war a commander could 
only be held criminally responsible for failing to punish those crimes by his 
subordinates of which he had knowledge.  
 
C. Post-World War II War Crimes Trials 
 
Although the international criminal tribunal contemplated at Versailles after 
World War I was never realized, war crimes tribunals were established in the 
wake of World War II by the victorious allies acting jointly (e.g., the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg) and by the individual victors acting 
alone (e.g., the U.S. Nuremberg Military Tribunal). Many of the war crimes 
tribunals created by the United States recognized command responsibility as 
a mode of liability for war crimes, though in cases such as United States v. 
Tomoyuki Yamashita22 and the Hostage Case,23 the tribunals did not articulate 
the elements of this mode of liability. And though the U.S. Nuremberg Mil-
itary Tribunal did not specify all the elements of command responsibility in 
the High Command Case, it did reject a strict liability for commanders, echoing 
the views expressed by the United States at Versailles in 1919. In doing so, 
the tribunal explicitly contemplated the potential application of the doctrine 
of command responsibility to the president as commander in chief of the 
U.S. military.24 
 
22. Trial of Tomoyuki Yamashita, U.S. Military Commission, Oct. 8–Dec. 7, 1945, 4 
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (1948); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
23. United States v. Wilhelm List, et al. (The Hostage Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIM-
INALS BEFORE THE NUREMBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 
NO. 10, at 1271 (1950) (“A commanding general of occupied territory is charged with the 
duty of maintaining peace and order, punishing crime, and protecting lives and property 
within the area of his command. His responsibility is coextensive with his area of command. 
He is charged with notice of occurrences taking place within that territory. He may require 
adequate reports of all occurrences that come within the scope of his power and, if such 
reports are incomplete or otherwise inadequate, he is obliged to require supplementary re-
ports to apprize him of all the pertinent facts. If he fails to require and obtain complete 
information, the dereliction of duty rests upon him and he is in no position to plead his own 
dereliction as a defense. Absence from headquarters cannot and does not relieve one from 
responsibility for acts committed in accordance with a policy he instituted or in which he 
acquiesced.”) 
24. United States v. von Leeb et al. (High Command Case), 11 TRIAL OF WAR CRIMI-
NALS BEFORE THE NUREMBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 











The tribunal in United States v. Soemu Toyoda,25 perhaps mindful of the 
critiques of the application of command responsibility in the Yamashita trial, 
including in the dissenting opinion of Justice Murphy,26 provided a more 
precise explication of the relevant legal standards.27 The Toyoda tribunal took 
care to specify the elements of command responsibility and clearly identified 
the duty to punish as one of those elements.  
  
The Tribunal considers the essential elements of command responsibility 
for atrocities of any commander to be: 
1. The offenses, commonly recognized as atrocities, were committed by 
troops of his command; 
2. The ordering of such atrocities. 
 
In the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the issuance of or-
ders, then the essential elements of command responsibility are: 
1. As before, that atrocities were actually committed;  
2. Notice of the commission thereof. This notice may be either: 
a. Actual, as in the case of an accused who sees their commission or 
who is informed thereof shortly thereafter; or  
 
of military operations of subordinates and most assuredly not of every administrative meas-
ure. He has the right to assume that details entrusted to responsible subordinates will be 
legally executed. The President of the United States is Commander in Chief of its military 
forces. Criminal acts committed by those forces cannot in themselves be charged to him on 
the theory of subordination. The same is true of other high commanders in the chain of 
command. Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of command from 
that fact alone. There must be a personal dereliction. That can occur only where the act is 
directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates consti-
tutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it must be a personal neglect amount-
ing to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquies-
cence. Any other interpretation of international law would go far beyond the basic principles 
of criminal law as known to civilized nations.”). 
25. United States v. Soemu Toyoda, International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
1948. 
26. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“He was not charged 
with personally participating in the acts or with ordering or condoning their commission. 
Not even knowledge of these crimes was attributed to him. It was simply alleged that he 
unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as a commander to control the op-
erations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit acts of atrocity. The 
recorded annals of warfare and the established principle of international law afford not the 
slightest precedent for such a charge.”). 
27. Hays Parks has suggested the more carefully-worded judgment of the Toyoda tribu-
nal, in contrast with the tribunal in Yamashita, was a result of General MacArthur’s inten-











b. Constructive. That is, the commission of such a great number of 
offenses within his command that a reasonable man could come 
to no other conclusion than that the accused must have known of 
the offense or of the existence of an understood and acknowl-
edged routine for their commission. 
3. Power of command. That is, the accused must be proved to have had 
actual authority over the offenders to issue orders to them not to commit 
illegal acts, and to punish offenders. 
4. Failure to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to 
control the troops under his command and to prevent acts which are vio-
lations of the laws of war. 
5. Failure to punish offenders.28  
 
The tribunal summarized the commander’s duty to punish under the 
heading of “Failure to punish offenders”: 
 
[Toyoda’s] duty as commander included his duty to control his troops, to 
take necessary steps to prevent the commission by them of atrocities, and 
to punish offenders. . . . If he knew, or should have known . . . of the 
commission by his troops of atrocities and if he did not do everything 
within his power and capacity under the existing circumstances to prevent 
their occurrence and punish the offenders, he was derelict in his duties.29  
 
For the purposes of international criminal law generally, and U.S. views 
of the law in particular, Toyoda provides the earliest clear articulation of the 
elements of command responsibility, including the duty to punish. 
 
D. U.S. Army Field Manual and the Necessary and Reasonable Standard 
 
Following World War II, the commander’s duty to punish war crimes by his 
subordinates was incorporated into the 1956 U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 
27-10:  
 
In some cases, military commanders may be responsible for war crimes 
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces, or other persons 
subject to their control. Thus, for instance, when troops commit massacres 
and atrocities against the civilian population of occupied territory or against 
 
28. United States v. Soemu Toyoda, Official Transcript of Record of Trial 5006, Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the Far East 1948 (emphasis added). 











prisoners of war, the responsibility may rest not only with the actual per-
petrators but also with the commander. Such a responsibility arises directly 
when the acts in question have been committed in pursuance of an order 
of the commander concerned. The commander is also responsible if he has 
actual knowledge, or should have knowledge, through reports received by 
him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his 
control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to 
take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law 
of war or to punish violators thereof.30  
 
The version of the duty incorporated into FM 27-10 appears to have 
been the first to adopt language requiring “necessary and reasonable” steps 
to punish subordinates responsible for war crimes. This necessary and rea-
sonable formulation would be replicated in a number of subsequent codifi-
cations of command responsibility in both international and U.S. domestic 
legal instruments.31 
 
E. Codifications of the Duty to Punish and U.S. Views 
 
1. Additional Protocol I 
 
Although the annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 incorporated 
the principle of command responsibility at a high-level of generality,32 Addi-
tional Protocol I included the first treaty-based codification of command re-
sponsibility as a specific mode of criminal liability and identified the failure 
of a commander to punish as a potential basis for criminal responsibility.  
 
 
30. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE ¶ 501 (1956) (emphasis added). 
31. See, e.g., FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, supra note 4, ¶ 8-31 (“Under international law, 
criminal responsibility may also fall on commanders or certain civilian superiors with similar 
authorities and responsibilities as military commanders if they had actual knowledge or con-
structive knowledge of their subordinates’ actions and failed to take ‘necessary and reason-
able’ measures to prevent or repress those violations.”). 
32. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 1, 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539, U.S.T.S. 539 (providing that an armed force must be “com-
manded by a person responsible for his subordinates” and that the commander of a force 
occupying enemy territory “shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure 
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the 











1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress 
grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, 
of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from a failure to act 
when under a duty to do so. 
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was com-
mitted by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or dis-
ciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information 
which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the 
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if 
they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or 
repress the breach.33  
 
Although the United States is not a party to the treaty, a review of Additional 
Protocol I by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that “[t]he obligations cre-
ated by Articles 86 and 87 are well within the precedents for war crimes 
liability established by American tribunals after World War II.”34 
 
2. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 
The atrocities that characterized the wars in the former Yugoslavia provided 
cause for the United States to reiterate, across two presidential administra-
tions, that military commanders as well as civilian superiors were obligated 
under international law to punish subordinates who committed war crimes. 
In the waning days of the tenure of President George H. W. Bush, Secretary 
of State Lawrence Eagleburger was goaded by author and Holocaust survi-
vor Elie Wiesel to publicly “name and shame” suspected Balkan war crimi-
nals.35 In a December 1992 speech in Geneva, Eagleburger identified a num-
ber of atrocities—the sniping of civilians, massacres, ethnic cleansing, and 
the torture of detainees— that had been committed in the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia and named specific perpetrators who should face trial for these 
crimes.36 Eagleburger repeatedly referred in his remarks to the responsibili-
ties of both the political leaders and military commanders leading the forces 
 
33. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 86, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
34. John W. Vessey Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Review of the 1977 First Ad-
ditional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 app. (May 3, 1985). 
35. Lawrence Eagleburger, Statement at the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia, Geneva, Switzerland, The Need to Respond to War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia 
(Dec. 16, 1992), reprinted in 3 DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH 923, 924 (1992). 











that committed these crimes. In concluding his speech, Eagleburger ob-
served that,  
 
Finally, there is another category of fact which is beyond dispute—namely, 
the fact of political and command responsibility for the crimes against hu-
manity which I have described. Leaders such Slobadan Milosevic, the Pres-
ident of Serbia, Radovan Karadzic, the self-declared President of the Ser-
bian Bosnian Republic, and General Rathko Mladic, commander of Bos-
nian Serb military forces, must eventually explain whether and how they 
sought to ensure, as they must under international law, that their forces 
complied with international law. They ought, if charged, to have the op-
portunity of defending themselves by demonstrating whether and how they 
took responsible action to prevent and punish the atrocities I have described 
which were undertaken by their subordinates.37 
 
Although Secretary Eagleburger took care not to squarely conclude 
(prior to trial) that the named leaders had committed war crimes, he none-
theless endorsed the principle that under international law such civilian su-
periors and military commanders had an obligation to punish subordinates 
who committed war crimes. 
The subsequent creation by the U.N. Security Council of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—as well as the practice of those 
courts—were the most significant developments in international criminal 
law since the post-World War II war crimes trials. The United States played 
a key role in the establishment of both tribunals and in the drafting of their 
respective statutes. Contemporaneous statements and positions taken by the 
United States related to the ICTY echoed Secretary Eagleburger and made 
clear that the United States regarded the duty to punish as well established 
under customary international law at the time. 
The ICTY was established by Security Council Resolution 827 of May 
23, 1993, in which the Security Council decided that the tribunal would have 
jurisdiction over “serious violations of international humanitarian law com-
mitted on the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be 
determined by the Security Council.”38 The adoption by the Security Council 
of an earlier-in-time effective date for the ICTY is notable. In order to avoid 
the ex post facto application of criminal law, the Council implicitly recognized 
 
37. Id. at 924 (emphasis added). 











that the substantive law to be applied by the ICTY already existed in treaty 
or customary international law. In other words, with respect to the law to be 
applied by the tribunal, the statute of the ICTY was merely declaratory of 
existing law.  
The United States later explicitly affirmed, in a 1995 amicus brief sub-
mitted to the ICTY, that it understood the law applied by the court to be 
pre-existing international law.39 The United States explained that in creating 
the ICTY, “the Council has not attempted to create new humanitarian law 
or to interfere with the way in which law is developed. The law to be applied 
by the Tribunal is established by convention and customary law, and af-
firmed by the General Assembly.”40 
The fact that the substantive law of the ICTY was pre-existing conven-
tional and customary law and understood to be so by the United States is 
particularly significant with respect to command responsibility.  
Article 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY provides for command responsi-
bility as a mode of responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide, offenses rooted both in treaty and customary international 
law.41 As recognized in the Statute, a commander may incur criminal respon-
sibility for failing to punish his subordinates for war crimes. In language rem-
iniscent of the Army Field Manual’s necessary and reasonable formulation, 
Article 7(3) specifies that: 
 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present 
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of 
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordi-
nate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed 
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to 
punish the perpetrators thereof.42  
 
Following the Security Council vote establishing the ICTY in 1993, U.S. 
ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright explained U.S. support 
 
39. Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cer-
tain Arguments Made by Counsel for the Accused in the Case of the Prosecutor of the 
Tribunal v. Dusan Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T (July 17, 1995). 
40. Id. at 25. 
41. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 7(3), 
S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993), adopting The Secretary-General Report Pursuant to Paragraph 
2 of Security Council Resolution 808.  











for the tribunal and drew attention to a few legal aspects of the ICTY’s stat-
ute. She specifically clarified that it was the understanding of the United 
States that “individual liability arises in . . . the failure of a superior—whether 
political or military—to take reasonable steps to prevent or punish such 
crimes by persons under his or her authority.”43 Albright’s speech is notable 
in that she not only recognized that international law imposed a duty to pun-
ish upon military commanders, but also that such duty existed for civilian 
superiors as well.  
Subsequent statements by the United States reemphasized its under-
standing that with respect to the duty to punish, the ICTY Statute merely 
restated existing law. In November 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher wrote in the Boston Globe that “[i]n establishing the tribunal, the Security 
Council has reaffirmed a fundamental principle that binds civilized societies: 
Those who carry out atrocities must be held accountable for their actions. 
So must those who have failed their legal duty to prevent and punish war 
crimes.”44 
In a 1994 speech about the Holocaust and the newly established war 
crimes tribunal the following year, Ambassador Albright expounded further 
on the well-established nature of the duty to punish.  
 
One advantage we have now is Nuremberg itself. Many of the legal argu-
ments put forward by defendants at Nuremberg were disposed of in the 
judgments there. Today, there should be no question that political and mil-
itary leaders may be held criminally accountable if they do not stop atroci-
ties by their followers or do not punish those responsible.45  
 
Again, Albright reiterated that the duty to punish extended to non-military 
superiors. 
Thus, as far as the United States was concerned, by 1994 there was “no 
question” that under international law a commander had a duty to punish 
war crimes committed by his subordinates and could be held criminally liable 
for failing to do so. Moreover, as emphasized by both Secretary Eagleburger 
 
43. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217th plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 
1993). 
44. Warren Christopher, Opinion, War Crimes Tribunal Will Bring Justice to Those Denied 
Peace, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1993. 
45. Madeline K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ad-
dress at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum: Bosnia in Light of the Holocaust: War 











and Ambassador Albright, this duty under international law applied to both 
military commanders and non-military superiors. 
 
3. The Rome Statute 
 
The United States is famously not a party to the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) and strongly objects to the ICC asserting ju-
risdiction over the nationals of non-State parties, including U.S. nationals. 
Nonetheless, the United States played a key role in the drafting of what 
would become Article 28 of the Rome Statute which provides for command 
responsibility. 
In a departure from earlier articulations of command responsibility, in-
cluding those the United States had recognized as reflecting customary in-
ternational law (such as Article 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY), the United 
States proposed a bifurcated standard for command responsibility for the 
Rome Statute.  
 
(a) A commander is criminally responsible for crimes under this Statute 
committed by forces under his or her command and effective control as a 
result of the commander’s failure to exercise properly this control where: 
(i) The commander either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the 
time, should have known, that the forces were committing or intending 
to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) The commander failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commis-
sion [or punish the perpetrators thereof]; 
 
(b) A civilian superior is criminally responsible for crimes under this Statute 
committed by subordinates under his or her authority where: 
(i) The superior knew that the subordinates were committing or in-
tending to commit a crime or crimes under this Statute; 
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the official respon-
sibility of the superior; 
(iii) The superior had the ability to prevent or repress the crime or 
crimes; and 
(iv) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission.46 
 
 
46. Proposal Submitted by the United States of America for Article 25, U.N. Doc. 











Under the U.S. proposal, military commanders would be held to a lower 
mens rea standard (i.e., knew or should have known) than civilian superiors 
(i.e., knew).47 However, under both the military and civilian standards pro-
posed by the United States, a superior has not only an ex ante duty to prevent, 
but also an ex post duty to “take all necessary and reasonable measures within 
his or her power” to repress atrocity crimes and punish the perpetrators 
thereof. 
The bifurcated proposal was the basis for what would ultimately become 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute. Article 28 provides, in pertinent part, that a 
military commander or civilian superior may bear criminal responsibility if 
he or she “failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or 
her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to 
the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”48 
The United States does not appear to have contemporaneously indicated 
in public whether it viewed the formulation of command responsibility ulti-
mately incorporated in the Rome Statute as reflecting customary interna-
tional law. Nonetheless, one U.S. official involved in the negotiations over 
the Rome Statute did later note that the United States found the treaty’s for-
mulations to be “acceptable.”49 
 
4. Iraqi Special Tribunal 
 
The duty to punish also featured in the war crimes tribunal the United States 
helped create in Iraq. Following the 2003 invasion, the U.S.-led occupation 
authority governing Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority, initiated the 
 
47. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court Rome, 2 Official Records Summary Records of the 
Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, at 136, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (2002) (The U.S. delegate explained that “[t]he main difference 
between civilian supervisors and military commanders lay in the nature and scope of their 
authority. The latter’s authority rested on the military discipline system, which had a penal 
dimension, whereas there was no comparable punishment system for civilians in most coun-
tries.”). 
48. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
49. William Lietzau, International Criminal Law after Rome: Concerns from a U.S. Military 
Perspective, 64 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 119, 124 (2001) (former Deputy Legal 
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and member of the U.S. delegation to 
the ICC negotiations stating that “a number of provisions regarding general principles of 












creation of an Iraqi Special Tribunal to try Iraqis for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and certain violations of Iraqi criminal law.50 Article 
15(e) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal provided for command re-
sponsibility and included a duty to punish, albeit in somewhat different and 
broader language than that used in the FM 27-10 formulation. 
 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 11 to 14 of the present 
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of 
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordi-
nate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed 
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.51  
 
Framed in language reminiscent of Article 28 of the Rome Statute, Article 
15(e) is further evidence that the United States recognized the duty to punish 
under customary international law. 
 
5. Incorporation of the Duty to Punish into U.S. Domestic Law 
 
Although neither Title 18 of the U.S. Code,52 nor the Uniform Code of Mil-
itary Justice53 provide for command responsibility as a distinct mode of crim-
inal liability, the international law standard for command responsibility has 
been incorporated into two different provisions of U.S. federal law: the Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) and the Military Commissions 
Act (MCA). Both statues adopt a standard for command responsibility from 
international law that includes the duty to punish. 
 
50. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 48, Delegation of Authority Regarding 
an Iraqi Special Tribunal (Dec. 10, 2003), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regula-
tions/20031210_CPAORD_48_IST_and_Appendix_A.pdf. 
51. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 15(d), Dec. 10, 2003, reprinted in 43 INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 231 (2004) (emphasis added). 
52. See Beth Van Schaack, Title 18’s Blind Spot: Superior Responsibility, JUST SECURITY (June 
3, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/11066/title-18s-blindspot-superior-responsibility/. 
53. See Geoffrey Corn & Rachel Van Landingham, Strengthening American War Crimes 
Accountability, 70 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 309, 359 (2020) (noting the absence 
of an explicit command responsibility provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) and calling for the UCMJ to be revised to include this mode of criminal liability); 
Victor Hansen, What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander—Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time 
for the United States to Adopt a Standard of Command Responsibility Towards Its Own, 42 GONZAGA 
LAW REVIEW 335, 343–44 (2006) (analyzing the failure of the UCMJ to explicitly provide 












i. Torture Victim Protection Act 
 
The TVPA was enacted to “carry out obligations of the United States under 
the United Nations Charter and other international agreements pertaining to 
the protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of 
damages from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.”54 
Although not mentioned explicitly in the text, the legislative history indicates 
that civil liability under the TVPA was intended to apply under the standard 
for command responsibility under international criminal law, including the 
duty to punish.55  
The two federal circuit courts of appeal to address the issue have held 
that pursuant to the international law standard to be applied under the 
TVPA, a superior commander may be liable for civil damages due to a failure 
to punish subordinates who commit atrocities. In Ford v. Garcia, the Eleventh 
Circuit held:  
 
The essential elements of liability under the command responsibility 
doctrine are: (1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship be-
tween the commander and the perpetrator of the crime; (2) that the com-
mander knew or should have known, owing to the circumstances at the 
time, that his subordinates had committed, were committing, or planned 
to commit acts violative of the law of war; and (3) that the commander 
failed to prevent the commission of the crimes, or failed to punish the sub-
ordinates after the commission of the crimes. Although the TVPA does 
not explicitly provide for liability of commanders for human rights viola-
tions of their troops, legislative history makes clear that Congress intended 
to adopt the doctrine of command responsibility from international law as 
part of the Act. Specifically identified in the Senate report is In re Yamashita 
. . . a World War II era case involving the command responsibility doctrine 
in habeas review of the conviction of a Japanese commander in the Philip-
pines by an American military tribunal. See S. Rep. No. 102–249, at 9 (1991). 
Describing Yamashita’s holding, the Senate Report stated that the Supreme 
Court found a foreign general “responsible for a pervasive pattern of war 
 
54. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Public Law 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
55. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9 (1991) (“Under international law, responsibility for tor-
ture, summary execution, or disappearances extends beyond the person or persons who 
actually committed those acts—anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or 











crimes (1) committed by his officers when (2) he knew or should have 
known they were going on but (3) failed to prevent or punish them.”56 
 
Notably, the Department of State later excerpted Ford’s analysis of command 
responsibility (again including the duty to punish) in its annual digest of U.S. 
practice in international law.57  
In Chavez v. Carranza, the Sixth Circuit adopted the same command re-
sponsibility standard articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Ford, including 
the duty to punish.58  
 
ii. Military Commissions 
 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush ordered the creation of 
military commissions to try suspected terrorist for “violations of the laws of 
war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.”59 The Department of 
Defense subsequently set forth the crimes triable by military commission in 
Military Commission Instruction No. 2. The instruction explained that the 
offenses were declaratory of existing international law. 
 
 
56. Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Doe v. Drummond 
Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ford, 289 F.3d at 1288); Penaloza v. 
Drummond Company, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 1344 (N.D. Ala 2019) (“Three indispen-
sable elements are required to support a claim for liability under the command responsibility 
doctrine: (1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the commander 
and the perpetrator of the crime; (2) that the commander knew or should have known, 
owing to the circumstances at the time, that his subordinates had committed, were commit-
ting, or planned to commit acts violative of the law of war; and (3) that the commander 
failed to prevent the commission of the crimes, or failed to punish the subordinates after 
the commission of the crimes.”). 
57. 2002 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 6, at 348–
49. 
58. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 499 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Three elements must be 
established for command responsibility to apply: (1) a superior-subordinate relationship be-
tween the defendant/military commander and the person or persons who committed hu-
man rights abuses; (2) the defendant/military commander knew, or should have known, in 
light of the circumstances at the time, that subordinates had committed, were committing, 
or were about to commit human rights abuses; and (3) the defendant/military commander 
failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent human rights abuses and 
punish human rights abusers.”). 
59. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 











No offense is cognizable in a trial by military commission if that offense 
did not exist prior to the conduct in question. These crimes and elements 
derive from the law of armed conflict, a body of law that is sometimes 
referred to as the law of war. They constitute violations of the law of armed 
conflict or offenses that, consistent with that body of law are triable by 
military commission. Because this document is declarative of existing law, 
it does not preclude trial for crimes that occurred prior to its effective 
date.60 
 
The instruction specified “command/superior responsibility” as a mode of 
liability and explicitly identified the duty to punish in language reminiscent 
of the ICTY Statute. 
 
Command/Superior Responsibility – Perpetrating 
 
a. Elements. 
(1) The accused had command and control, or effective authority and con-
trol, over one or more subordinates; 
(2) One or more of the accused’s subordinates committed, attempted to 
commit, conspired to commit, solicited to commit, or aided or abetted the 
commission of one or more substantive offenses triable by military 
commission; 
(3) The accused either knew or should have known that the subordinate or 
subordinates were committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to com-
mit, soliciting, or aiding or abetting such offense or offenses; and 
(4) The accused failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within 
his power to prevent or repress the commission of the offense or of-
fenses.61 
 
Thus, Military Commission Instruction No. 2 further reinforces the point 
that the United States viewed the duty to punish as an element of command 
responsibility under the pre-existing (customary) law of war in 2003. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,62 which 
held that the initial incarnation of the military commissions was unlawful, 
Congress enacted the 2006 Military Commissions Act (2006 MCA).63 The 
2006 MCA states: “This chapter establishes procedures governing the use of 
 
60. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2, ¶ 3(A) (Apr. 
30, 2003). 
61. Id. ¶ 6(C)(3)(a). 
62. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 











military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in 
hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other 
offenses triable by military commission.”64 Echoing the earlier Military Com-
mission Instruction No. 2, the 2006 MCA specified that “the provisions of 
this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally been triable by military 
commissions. This chapter does not establish new crimes that did not exist 
before its enactment, but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military 
commission.”65 
Once again, the pre-existing law declared by the 2006 MCA included a 
duty to punish as an element of command responsibility, in substantially the 
same language as the earlier Military Commission Instruction No. 2. 
 
Any person is punishable as a principal under this chapter who— 
(1) commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, or procures its commission; 
(2) causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him would be 
punishable by this chapter; or 
(3) is a superior commander who, with regard to acts punishable under this 
chapter, knew, had reason to know, or should have known, that a subordi-
nate was about to commit such acts or had done so and who failed to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof.66  
 
The 2009 Military Commissions Act also included substantially the same 
standard for command responsibility as its predecessor, including the duty 
to punish.67 The 2009 MCA, signed into law by President Obama, again pur-
ported to codify existing law, incorporating “offenses that have traditionally 
been triable under the law of war or otherwise triable by military commis-
sion.” Senator Lindsey Graham (at the time a reserve judge advocate in the 
U.S. Air Force) emphasized this point on the floor of the Senate. “Congress 
 
64. Id. § 948b. 
65. Id. § 950p. 
66. Id. § 950q (emphasis added).  
67. Pub. L. No. 111-84 §§ 1801-07 (2009) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950q(3) (“a superior 
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known, that a subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and who failed to 
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetra-











has codified offenses which have traditionally been tried by military commis-
sions under customary international law,”68 he stated.  
 
IV. CONTRARY EVIDENCE 
 
There does not appear to be any indication that the United States has ever 
specifically rejected or called into question the duty to punish as an element 
of command responsibility. Moreover, all formulations of the standard for 
command responsibility endorsed by the United States over the last fifty 
years as reflecting customary international law have incorporated some ver-
sion of a duty to punish.  
That said, the United States has not always been precise in articulating 
the standard for command responsibility. This imprecision is especially true 
with respect to many of the post-World War II war crimes cases (e.g., Yam-
ashita, the High Command Case, and the Hostage Case) which did not clearly 
define the standard for command responsibility being applied. Likewise, 
some commentaries on the law of war by the Department of Defense have 




The weight of evidence establishes that all three branches of the U.S. gov-
ernment have recognized that under customary international law, a com-
mander has a duty to punish subordinates who commit war crimes and that 
the failure to fulfill this duty may itself constitute a war crime. Although the 
formulation and applicability of this duty have evolved since Americans first 
 
68. 111 CONG. REC. S10663 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Lindsay Gra-
ham). 
69. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL 1140–41 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) (identifying command responsibility 
as a mode of liability and citing to the ICTY and ICTR statutes, as well as the High Command 
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but see FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, supra note 4, ¶ 8-6 (“Under international law, criminal re-
sponsibility may also fall on commanders or certain civilian superiors with similar authorities 
and responsibilities as military commanders if they had actual knowledge or constructive 
knowledge of their subordinates’ actions and failed to take ‘necessary and reasonable’ 
measures to prevent or repress those violations. That is, commanders may be held respon-
sible if they knew or should have known, through reports received by them or by other 
means, that troops or other persons subject to their control were about to commit or have 












acknowledged it in the colonial period, a few salient points are worth em-
phasizing regarding U.S. views on the duty to punish. 
First, the duty to punish is a duty imposed on individuals by international 
law, specifically the law of war, not merely domestic law. The individual duty 
is in addition to whatever obligations a State may have under international 
law to extradite or punish war criminals. Second, at least since the 1990s, the 
United States has understood this duty to punish to apply to civilian superi-
ors as well as military commanders. Third, as explained by the U.S. repre-
sentatives in Versailles in 1919, the duty to punish is not one of strict liability. 
A commander or superior must have knowledge, either actual or construc-
tive, of the crimes of his subordinates for the duty to be triggered. 
Discussions of, and efforts to promote, accountability for atrocity 
crimes, both domestically and abroad, should be informed by the United 
States’ own long-standing view that a commander’s failure to take necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to punish war crimes by 
his subordinates may itself amount to a war crime. 
